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INTRODUCTION
Having twice addressed the issues of neutrality during World War
11,1 I shift my focus now to questions of the continuing vitality of
neutrality law at the end of the millennium. One of the purposes of
this symposium is raising the question: how should states respond to
the next genocidal episode? While in a sense the Holocaust is and
will remain unique in history we recognize that there is a grisly
similarity between the members of a set of historical events that we
have learned to call genocide. The possibility of its recurrence have
sufficiently concerned nations to join together in a widely adhered to
treaty on the topic.' It is natural to use the term "neutrality" in refer-
* Bemis Professor of International Law, Harvard Law School
1. See Detlev Vagts, Switzerland, International Law and World War II. 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 466 (1997); Detlev Vagts, Neutralio , Law in World War II
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
2. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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ence to the behavior of not becoming involved in an episode of
genocide. In that context, "neutrality" means indifference, callous-
ness, or a studied calculation of costs and benefits. The term "neu-
trality" in a legal sense, however, may not apply if there is no war
going on because the law of neutrality only becomes effective if
there is a war or something similar in progress. The legal counterpart
to the moral issues about standing by is the problem of humanitarian
intervention, whether under the aegis of the United Nations Security
Council ("UNSC") or by a state individually.
The rules of neutrality law are still those of the Hague Conven-
tions on war on land and naval warfare laid down in 1907.' They
have not changed, even though other rules relating to the law of war
were modernized in the 1920s and again after World War II. They
have a slightly musty quality to them. For example, they do not refer
at all to issues of war in the air, and their dispositions with regard to
naval passage through neutral waters and into neutral ports reflect a
world in which sweating teams of stokers moved coal from bunkers
to furnaces beneath boilers. The major reason for the neglect of neu-
trality law is that war and neutrality were both thought rendered ob-
solete by the coming of the United Nations and its regime of collec-
tive security. That is not quite accurate. Since World War II,
episodes have arisen in which either the parties to the conflict or out-
siders have invoked neutrality law. To update neutrality law, it is
3. See Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 28, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1
Bevans 654 [hereinafter Hague Land Convention]; Hague Convention XIII Con-
cerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2415, 1 Bevans 723 [hereinafter Hague Naval Convention].
4. Recent discussions of neutrality law are scarce. Some articles approach
matters from a Swiss perspective, which is idiosyncratic since Switzerland Is al-
most the only country not a member of the United Nations. See, e.g., Dietrich
Schindler, Changing Concepts of Neutrality in Switzerland, 44 AUSTR. J. PUB.
INT'L L. 1056 (1992); Daniel Thfirer, ZUR NEUTRALITAT DER SCHWEIZ IM
ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG UND DEN DARAUS ZU ZIEHENDEN LEHREN IN DER
VERFASSUNGSSTAAT VOR NEUEN HERAUSFORDERUNGEN, FESTSCHRIFT FUR YVO
HANGARTNER 95 (1998). See generally Dietrich Schindler, Transformations in te
Law of Neutrality since 1945, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
CHALLENGES AHEAD 367 (Astrid Delissen & Gerard Tanja eds., 1991); Patrick
Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality, The Shadow of the Law of Neutral-
ity, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249 (1975); Yoram Dinstein, The Laws of Neutrality 14
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS 80 (1984).
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necessary to do so at a time when no important war-like conflict is
taking place. One needs a Rawlsian veil of ignorance because if you
play with the rules at a time of impending hostilities, one side will
benefit from the change.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEUTRALITY
A. IN GENERAL
Neutrality rules are viewed in very different lights depending upon
the type of conflict from which nations may stay neutral. Over time
we see two polar paradigms. The first type of conflict is the simple
one-on-one war. In such a confrontation two states-with perhaps
some allies-fight it out for objectives that they value, but which
they do not really expect other countries to take to heart. Thus, both
the national leaders and the populations of Prussia and France in
1870-1871 had specific nationalistic objectives in mind when they
went to war, reasons that they felt deeply and were ready to die for.
They did not, however, expect Britons, Americans or Japanese to
feel strongly and asked that they stay out. More recently, the Iran-
Iraq war of the 1980s fits this pattern.
The second type of war is the crusade. If you are fighting to make
the world safe for democracy-or for Christianity, Islam, capitalism,
Communism or the Four Freedoms-you find it incomprehensible or
immoral that some states will not join you. The Crusades themselves
were, of course, just such a struggle and the Church preached that
slacking was a sin. When the Emperor Frederick I1 of Hohenstaufen
negotiated a perfectly reasonable compromise with respect to the
holy places of Jerusalem, allocating opportunities for worship to the
Christians and Muslims, he was promptly denounced by an outraged
Pope who could not excommunicate him as he had already done so.
In the sixteenth century, the Reformation brought to Europe a long
series of conflicts in which religious passion played a leading role.
Theorists talked about just wars and unjust wars," treating the oppo-
5. See ERNST KANTOROWIcZ, FREDERICK THE SECOND, 1194-1250, at 183-89
(E.O. Lounder trans., 1931).
6. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (2d ed. 1992) (providing modem review of the
idea of the just war); Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Just War in Interna-
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site persuasion almost as if they were Muslims. The Thirty Years
War began as a war of faith and fanaticism, but by the end of the pe-
riod realpolitik considerations crept in and there were alliances be-
tween Protestant and Catholic powers that seemed really strange
from a proper religious perspective Wars of the eighteenth century
were about dynastic issues or about the balance of power8 that even
the populace of the warring countries could become passionate over.
International lawyers and theorists ceased to talk about "just wars"
and analyzed conflicts as balance of power issues.
The French Revolution initially caught up Republican-minded
enthusiasts in Europe and the Americas in a way that transcended the
more detached attitudes surrounding eighteenth century wars. It later
subsided into a more classic bipolar controversy between France and
Great Britain. The century from 1815 to 1914 was, particularly in
Europe, marked by the absence of crusades and the prevalence of
wars for national unification or for balance of power reasons. It is
significant that the Hague Conventions on neutrality came into being
near the end of that period and are influenced by that history.
The first World War became a full blown crusade as the parties
became more and more intense in their devotion to their causes. That
it was a war to end wars and to make the world safe for democracy
became more apparent as the participants multiplied and the sacri-
fices piled up. The Treaty of Versailles signaled that the victors re-
garded themselves as having achieved a moral triumph of universal
proportions. In it the defeated enemy was compelled to take onto it-
self the onus of having started the war.9 From the beginning World
War II took on such a shape. When as cool and unemotional a par-
ticipant as General Eisenhower could title part of his memoirs Cru-
sade in Europe, you knew that this was not a cold-blooded enter-
tionalLaw, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 605 (1939) (providing legal history survey).
7. See C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1981).
8. For an account of the balance of power in international law in relation to
war see Alfred Vagts & Detlev Vagts, The Balance of Power in International Law.,
A History of An Idea, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 555 (1979). For a broader survey of the
concept see MICHAEL SHEEHAN, THE BALANCE OF POWER: HISTORY AND THEORY
(1996).
9. The German language literature on the war guilt question is enormous. See,
e.g., HAJO HOLBORN, KRIEGSSCHULD UND REPARATIONEN AUF DER PARISER
FRIEDENSKONFERENZ VON 1919 (1932).
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prise.' ° The moral revulsion at the killing of civilians, destruction of
democracy, and the Holocaust made World War II a moral crusade.
B. THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
The United States has had a special relationship with "neutrality"
starting from the early days of the Republic. We were strongly im-
portuned to come to the aid of one side or the other in the successive
stages of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Age between
1789 and 1815. Plots were hatched and plans made to undermine our
neutrality by both sides, and sympathies were divided in the young
republic. The United States sought to defend its neutral commercial
rights and did so by all the means available to it, even though the
military might of the United States was not then impressive in rela-
tion to that of the contesting European powers. The Embargo of 1807
and the battles of the fledgling navy with French and British war-
ships at least showed how seriously the United States took the propo-
sition that it had the right to remain neutral and to conduct its trade
with both parties and with other neutrals. Questions of neutral navi-
gation rights finally became a significant element in the coming of
the War of 1812." Neutrality next became a major topic in the
United States during the Civil War. During this contest the role of
the United States was different. It wanted other countries to remain
neutral and let it get about the business of subduing the confederate
states and, later, of emancipating the slaves. Whether Britain did or
did not violate the rules when it permitted the construction and
floating of the raider Alabama, was a highly contentious issue re-
solved years later by the arbitration that bears that name." It happens
that Edward Bemis contributed the chair at Harvard on which I sit
because of his sense during the proceedings that American lawyers
were inadequately trained in the law of neutrality. It is sometimes
forgotten that a related arbitration involved quite a few claims
against the United States as well."3 General Sherman, in chopping a
10. See DWIGHT EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE (1948).
11. See SAMUEL F. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ch.
X (5th ed. 1965).
12. See THOMAS WILLING BALCH, THE ALABAMA ARBITRATION (1900).
13. See 1 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY
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swath of destruction across the lower Confederacy did not always
pay heed to the distinctiveness of British-owned plantations and de-
stroyed them too.
The guns of August 1914 found the United States comfortably re-
moved from hostilities. President Wilson was reelected in 1916 with
a slogan that "he kept us out of War."" A few months later he led the
United States into war alongside the allies. The motivations of
Americans included a sense that the Kaiser had, through unrestricted
submarine warfare, violated the neutral rights of this country-and,
of course, the sufferings of brave little neutral Belgium were cast into
the balance. World War II represented a repeat of the cycle. There
was a vigorous American movement in favor of neutrality, fueled by
a sense that we had been misled by British propaganda against the
"Huns" in 1917 and should not repeat what had been a mistaken in-
volvement. The leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt moved
the United States step-by-step deeper and deeper into unneutral ac-
tivity, such as Lend Lease, the destroyer-bases deal and naval patrols
aimed at German U-boats. 5 He did not, however, carry the day in the
sense of getting us into the war until Japan attacked neutral Pearl
Harbor and both Japan and Germany declared war on the United
States. Once in the war, Americans regarded it as a crusade and had
scant sympathy for those who sought to avoid involvement.
II. THE PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF
NEUTRALITY
In the post-World War II epoch the status of neutrality has signifi-
cantly changed. Some believed that neutrality would disappear. In-
deed, it was a very negative sign for neutrality when the Allies pro-
claimed that a country had to declare war against the Axis by
February 1945 or suffer the penalty of being deemed not "peace-
683-702 (1898).
14. See generally CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL, AMERICA GOES TO WAR (1938);
THOMAS A. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 588 (9th
ed. 1974).
15. I should disclose that my grandfather, Charles Beard, was an intellectual
leader of the pro-neutrality contingent. See PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE
COMING OF THE WAR, 1941: A STUDY IN APPEARANCES AND REALITY (1948).
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loving" and ineligible for United Nations membership. ' After 1945,
it was believed that, at least in legal terms, "war" was outlawed and
that therefore there were no actions that would allow states to remain
neutral.1 7 The idea of neutrality's total disappearance, however, is an
exaggeration. The present legal status of neutrality depends on what
a state is trying to remain uninvolved in. First, consider a situation in
which the UNSC has exercised its powers under Chapter VII of the
Charter to deal with a threat to or breach of peace. Under Article 41,
the UNSC can require Member States to sever economic relations
and communications with an offending state. It appears that the
UNSC cannot go further and call upon states to provide military
forces without their consent since that is predicated upon a special
agreement or agreements.'8 The United Nations could, however.
through the United Nations budgetary mechanism, compel a state to
make a financial contribution to the military operation.'9 It is unlikely
that a member state would find itself obligated to provide forces on
United Nations missions rights of passage across its territory since
that duty is also predicated upon agreement." In the absence of the
United Nations system, it is unlawful for a neutral to take such ac-
tions, that is, to cut off all trade with one party to the conflict, or to
make passage over its territory and airspace available to one side. A
country that was the target of such enforcement action could not tell
a state that was participating in that action its behavior was "unneu-
tral." Quite a few states, most conspicuously the People's Republic
of China ("PRC"), did take the position that they were neutral during
the Korea conflict of 1950-1953, which was a United Nations opera-
tion under the aegis of the UNSC.2'
There is a second category of events in which two or more nations
are busy shooting at and bombing each other but there has been no
16. See Louis B. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 55-91 (1967) (pro-
viding history of the struggles over admission to the UN, in particular as to states
that remained neutral during World War I).
17. See Norton, supra note 4, at 249-51.
18. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 639 (Bruno
Simma ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE CHARTERI.
19. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (ul. 20).
20. See THE CHARTER, supra note 18.
21. See Norton, supra note 4. at 263-67.
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decisive reaction from the UNSC. One such case involved the off
and on hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors from 1948 to
1973.22 Although there was even a declared state of war during some
of this period neither the combatants nor non-participants invoked
the law of neutrality in a consistent way. States delivered arms to
belligerents in a manner clearly contrary to the Hague Conventions.
One notes that the UNSC did not impose a formal embargo on trade
with either side, although it made numerous appeals for a cease-fire
and took other positions as to the issues involved. This was the case,
for example, with the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq in the
1980's. The UNSC appealed to the belligerents to join in a cease-
fire, but did not issue an order under its enforcement powers.23 In the
absence thereof third countries found themselves trying to act as
neutrals. There was in particular a sudden reappraisal of long for-
gotten rules about blockades, prohibited zones, minelaying, and other
features of the law of maritime neutrality. The speed with which
Great Britain recovered the Falklands Islands prevented it from gen-
erating the quantity of interesting case law that emerged from the
Gulf War.24 The traditional obligation to remain neutral in such a
situation is perhaps reinforced by the fact that resorting to force by
joining in the conflict would likely constitute a violation of Article
2(4) of the Charter.
Finally, there are cases in which the genocidal atrocities are
strictly internal to a state. None of the actions cross national fron-
tiers, and there may not even be internal fighting because the targeted
portion of the population is incapable of resort to force in self-
defense. The traditional law of neutrality takes hold in these situa-
tions only in the event that the contending force attains a level of
power that causes other nations to recognize it as a belligerent. Until
that time arrives traditional international law favored the government
in power. In the orthodox view of neutrality law no obligation to re-
main neutral arose so long as the rebellious force was not recognized
22. See id. at 257-62.
23. See S.C. Res. 479, U.N. SCOR, 2244th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res./479 (1980);
S.C. Res. 582, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., at 11-12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/582 (1986).
24. But see, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428 (1989) (dismissing a claim against the Argentinean government for de-
stroying two cargo ships during the military conflict over the Falkland Islands).
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as a belligerent. No rule prevented a country from providing assis-
tance to a government that asked for help in putting down a rebellion
against its lawful authority. Giving aid to rebels not recognized as
belligerents violated the sovereign rights of the lawful state.
The salient examples of the application of neutrality rules in civil
wars before the United Nations age were the American civil war in
the nineteenth century and the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939.6
The United States has relied in various situations upon the local gov-
ernment's permission to send counter-insurgency advisers, arms and
equipment, and the like. The United States categorized its last great
experiment with non-neutrality, the Vietnam War, as assistance to
the government in Saigon. 6 When a rebelling force has reached the
degree of stability and power to become a recognized belligerent is
of course a matter of judgment as to which outside states will differ
from each other and from the country trying to restore its authority.
If the PRC were to attempt to recover Taiwan by force, most states
would regard that as implicating neutrality law even though the PRC
would likely characterize it as a purely internal quarrel. Note that the
question is parallel to, but not identical with, the question whether a
conflict is international so as to bring into play the various Geneva
conventions that govern the conduct of international fighting.'
Thus, there still is room for neutrality rules to operate in the post-
1945 world. That is true even though there is almost never a willing-
ness to refer to what is going on as a "war," the term that classically
was cited before one could invoke the law of neutrality. There is,
then, some purpose in thinking about how to change the law of neu-
trality.
25. See NORMAN PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN THE
SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1939).
26. Compare Richard Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the
Vietnam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966), with JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND
THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972)
27. For recent reviews of these problems examine Steven Ratner. The Schizo-
phrenias of International Criminal Law. 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 237 (1998): Theodor
Meron, Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua s
Fallout, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (1998).
19981
AM. U INT'L L. RE v.
III. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS
If a country settles into a position as neutral, what are its rights and
duties vis-.a-vis the belligerents? The basic statement of these rules is
still embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907.28 As one might
predict, these ninety-year-old rules, unlike other law of war docu-
ments, have never been formally amended. One is not quite sure
whether the effort to amend them is worthwhile, given all of the
other possible uses for scholars' and diplomats' time. Let us look at
them, however, in general terms.
First, a neutral should not fight. More or less by definition that
seems to be an obvious rule. There are some marginal questions,
particularly in that it is not always forbidden for citizens of neutral
countries to enlist themselves privately in the armies of the combat-
ants." Spain, for example, seems to have crossed the line rather ob-
viously when it sent a full division under government auspices to
fight with Hitler in Russia." Most outsiders did not accept the Chi-
nese position that the forces that came over the Yalu to drive the
United Nations forces back to the 38th parallel were purely volun-
teers." American individuals' participation in the Eagle Squadron for
England and the Flying Tigers for China, on the other hand, seemed
permissible.
Secondly, belligerents should respect the territorial integrity of a
neutral state.Z A neutral should defend its land and airspace, by force
if necessary. On land the rules seems quite straightforward, as does
the exception for wounded personnel and such corollary duties as the
obligation to intern troops that flee across the border.3  The law of
neutrality at sea developed from a different tradition and is distinctly
more complex. It allows war vessels to pass through neutral waters
28. See sources cited supra note 1 (analyzing the issues of neutrality that arose
during World War II).
29. See Hague Land Convention, supra note 3, art. V1.
30. See GERALD KLEINFELD & LEWIS TAUBS, THE BLUE DIVISION IN Russia
(1979).
31. See Howard Taubenfeld, International Actions and Neutrality, 47 AM. J.
INT'L L. 377, 392 n.92 (1953).
32. See Hague Land Convention, supra note 3, arts. I & II.
33. See id. arts. XI & XIV.
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and to stop in neutral ports. These privileges are qualified in complex
ways and stated in terms that seem antiquarian, stemming from the
days of bunkering and coal.34 Customary law generated the corre-
sponding rules on air transit." The first aviation experiments of 1907
occurred too soon for the drafters to include the topic in either con-
vention. By 1918 the law had settled on the proposition that air war
was like land war and not like war at sea. Warring states were not
supposed to fly over neutral airspace and neutrals air forces were to
do their best to stop them if they did. Sweden and Switzerland in
World War II had their hands full trying to carry out that obligation. '
There are quite a few details of air war neutrality left obscure by the
customary law. What about satellite passages over neutral territory at
very high altitudes? Is there a duty on the part of neutrals to warn be-
fore shooting? Can neutral fighters hotly pursue violators of their air-
space back over other states' territory?
Some people are aghast that neutrals went on trading with the en-
emy during both world wars. That is explicitly allowed, however, by
the Hague rules. The only restrictions they impose are (1) that the
neutral state, as distinguished from private merchants of death, may
not sell munitions to the belligerents, (2) that whatever restrictions
on trade are imposed are even handed as between the warring states."
That evenhandedness has been measured in terms of the content of
the rules themselves rather than of substantive effect. Thus, "cash
and carry" policies are legitimate even if one of the warring powers
cannot get together the cash or is prevented by geography or superior
naval forces from doing any carrying. There are, of course, border-
line questions. Was it legitimate for the state to finance arms pur-
chases by belligerents? What about weapons sales by agencies that
are basically government instrumentalities even if separately incor-
porated? Should the neutrality rules now be revised to prohibit all
arms sales from neutral states to belligerents? That seems the hu-
manitarian approach, but one must take into account that it may bear
34. See Hague Naval Convention, supra note 3. arts. X-XIX.
35. SeeJ.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS ch. XVII (3d ed. 1947).
36. See id.
37. See Hague Land Convention, supra note 3, arts. VII & IX.
38. For a statement of this position during World War I, examine 7 GREENE
HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 450-51 (1940).
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very unevenly on the contestants if one is more self-sufficient than
the other, as was the case with the League of Nations arms embargo
during the war between Italy and Ethiopia in the 1930s.
Perhaps the most opaque questions are those relating to the limits,
if any, to be placed on economic warfare against neutrals by the war-
ring powers. Is it legitimate to freeze the overseas assets of neutral
states and their nationals? Is it legitimate to interfere with neutral
states trading with each other on the basis that such trade might lead
to re-exports to enemies? Can one maintain blacklists of neutral mer-
chants so as to punish them for trading with the other side? There
was extensive practice on this score during both world wars particu-
larly by Great Britain and the United States.39 Naval interference with
merchant shipping has a complex legal history. While looting of pri-
vate property on land is strictly illegal, prize law always authorized
expropriation of enemy vessels, even if commercial. The status of
neutral shipping is complex. A proper blockade can keep them out of
enemy ports. It is not clear whether less discriminating declarations
of prohibited zones, enforced by somewhat random sinkings, can do
the same.40 The right of belligerents to check on the high seas indirect
passages of contraband by neutral shipping is complex and con-
tested.4
Finally, neutrals may render services as intermediaries, recipients
of refugees, succorers of the victims, and so forth. These are not,
strictly speaking, neutral duties, although only neutrals can perform
them. These services are subject to certain regularizing rules. For ex-
ample, the activities of neutral protecting powers with respect to
prisoners of war are regulated in some detail by one of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, which was then revised by the Geneva Con-
39. See MARTIN DOMKE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR 11 (1943);
W.M. MEDLIcOTr, THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE (2d. ed. 1959).
40. See Ross Leckow, The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf- The Law of War
Zones, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 629 (1988).
41. For reviews of naval neutrality, actuated chiefly by the Persian Gulf war,
examine Michael Bothe, Neutrality in Naval Warfare: What is left of Traditional
International Law?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES
AHEAD 387 (Astrid Delissen & Gerard Tanja eds., 1991); NATALINO RONZITrI,
THE CRISIS OF TRADITIONAL LAW REGULATING INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS AT SEA AND THE NEED FOR ITS REVISION IN THE LAW OF NAVAL
WARFARE 1 (Natalino Ronzitti et al. eds., 1988)
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vention of 1929, and again in 1949, unlike neutrality law itself."
IV. MODERN "NEUTRALITY"-THE MORAL
ISSUES
One of the consequences of the 1990s revival of interest in neu-
trality in World War II, particularly its relationship to the Holocaust,
is to highlight questions about the morality of neutrality in the
broader sense. Recall that the concept of neutrality in the traditional
international law sense does not capture all of the subject matter of
this section. If some other country has gone to war because of geno-
cide somewhere, it is appropriate to think of other states as being
neutral or not. The first country to act, however, confronts a set of
problems under international law but not that of neutrality. The dis-
cussion of the existence of a right or an obligation to take action to
prevent genocidal episodes is largely carried out under a somewhat
different heading and with a somewhat different angle. Books and
articles about humanitarian intervention tend to discuss the issue
whether intervention to prevent genocidal or similar misbehavior is
permissible under the United Nations Charter. First of all, there is the
question whether the UNSC can act on an issue. That is particularly
debatable when the existence of a threat to the peace is questionable.
The first extensive reading of its powers took place in 1965 with re-
spect to the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia.1
3
This episode involves neither atrocities nor the sending of armed
forces. Since the ending of the Cold War and the almost automatic
resort of the great powers to the veto such episodes are now more
common. Somalia and Haiti have seen the UNSC authorize the
sending of troops in cases where that threat seemed quite attenu-
ated.44 Theoreticians seem to generally agree that the UNSC's judg-
42. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 12 August
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relating to Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929.
47 Stat. 2021; Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land. Annex-
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Oct. 18. 1907. ch.
II, 36 Stat. 2277.
43. For a discussion of this affair see FREDERIC KIRGIS. INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 620-35 (2d ed. 1993).
44. See id. at 699-70 1.
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ment is non-reviewable."
Then we have the question of the licitness of unilateral interven-
tion not under the aegis of the United Nations. Proponents of hu-
manitarian intervention tend to argue either that Article 2(4) prohibi-
tion on the use or threat of force does not apply to a "surgical strike"
that does not threaten the territorial or political integrity of the target
state or else that humanitarian intervention on account of its moral
significance falls entirely outside the structure of the Charter. Oppo-
nents argue that unilateral intervention is dangerous because motiva-
tions of the intervenor are likely tainted by self-interest and not sub-
ject to third party scrutiny.4" The concrete cases that intervention
advocates refer to are usually classical surgical operations such as
Entebbe, Grenada, and Panama. They are typically launched by great
powers against small states and were planned not to involve appre-
ciable casualties or other costs. Overwhelmingly the intended benefi-
ciaries of the strikes were nationals of the intervening state, allowing
their rapid removal from the country. Indeed, arguably these actions
were justified acts of self-defense within Article 51 of the Charter.
Less attention is paid to incursions by lesser powers such as the Tan-
zanian incursion into Uganda to oust Idi Amin 7 or Vietnamese op-
erations in Cambodia.
45. Compare Thomas Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation ": Who is the Ul-
timate Guardian of UNLegality, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 520-22 (1992) (analyzing
the ICJ holding in Libya v. U.S. that United Nations members must accept and
carry out the decisions of the UNSC), with David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the
Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 562-66 (1993)
(commenting that the UNSC may cross the bounds of legitimacy that in turn may
result in United Nations members questioning its authority) and W. Michael Rels-
man, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 95-99
(1993) (presenting a framework under which the ICJ can review aspects of UNSC
decisions).
46. For an overview of the literature on unilateral intervention, see BURNS
WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 276-301 (2d ed. 1997).
For a comprehensive recent treatment, see SEAN MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (1996). In
general enthusiasm over humanitarian intervention is confined to United States
writers. See THE CHARTER, supra note 18, at 123-24. Perhaps the most enthusiastic
advocate is FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997).
47. See CAROLINE THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION
179-95 (1985).
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Different issues arise if a state resorts to economic sanctions rather
than to force to try to stop a genocidal program. The United States is
particularly prone to use such means when offended by human rights
abuses. Both the levels of the abuse and the responses thereto have
varied substantially. While there were some successes, such as the
use of trade pressure on the Soviet Union to let dissenters emigrate,
there is general agreement that dictators are quite resistant to such
measures.48 While attempts are made to argue that there are interna-
tional law limits on such activities, countries like the United States
have taken the position that they are entirely free to impose such
sanctions. The case is perhaps most doubtful when the state that is
targeted is a member of the World Trade Organization. The legality
of actions by the United States against Cuba and Iran has thus far es-
caped formal resolution."
We now consider the question of a moral/political duty to act from
the point of view of a national government charged with the task of
maximizing the utilities of the citizenry of the country it leads. First,
the government has to ask how passionately its citizens feel the need
to save the victims. This may depend on the strength of ethnic ties
between the targets and the internal population. Recall the feelings in
India about the victimization of the Hindu population of East Paki-
stan. We now feel concern about the possible widening of the strug-
gle in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians to include kinsfolk in
Albania and, by further extensions through Macedonia, in Greece
and Bulgaria. The media also plays an important role. American en-
thusiasm for war against Spain a century ago was stoked by the
newspaper accounts of Spanish atrocities in Cuba, for which William
Randolph Hearst took much credit."0 CNN's coverage of horrors in
Bosnia stirred indignation, though for a long time not enough to
48. See Richard Haass, Sanctioning Madness, FOREIGN AFF.. Nov.Dec.. 1997.
at 74 (providing a survey of the efficacy of sanctions and coming to rather negative
conclusions).
49. In return for concessions by the United States the European Union agreed
not to raise the issue of "GATT conformity" through World Trade Organization
dispute resolution procedures. See European Union-United States: Memorandum
of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 11, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 529 (1997).
50. The classic history is FRANK FREIDEL. A SPLENDID LrITLE WAR (1958).
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cause action."'
There are some positive values of intervention. First, one some-
times avoids the possibility that the dictator will, after polishing off
others, come after X and gobble X up when it is alone and friendless.
That is the international version of the famous statement attributed to
Martin Niemoller that appeared on the flyer announcing this confer-
ence. 2 Facing the issue now also avoids bracing for a long and bur-
densome period of armed preparedness, which would not only im-
pose financial costs but would also require restrictions on the
liberties of the population. Joining with other nations in such action
would ingratiate one with that portion of the international community
and might be used to bargain for specific benefits. This was the mo-
tivation for quite a few of the late adherents to the United Nations in
1945. Failure of the government of Ireland to enter into serious ne-
gotiations with the British for the exchange of anti-submarine bases
in Irish ports-a surrender of neutrality-for concessions as to the
six counties of Northern Ireland cost Ireland dearly, particularly
Northern Ireland. 3
Finally, one possible motivation for a state taking action is its
knowledge that the situation was in part caused by its own policies.
Thus, cold war tactics did much to set up the situations in Somalia
and Cambodia that resulted in so much killing. Colonialism and
haste in terminating it could underlie the disasters in Rwanda, East
Timor and along the India-Pakistan frontier. The powers in question
did make some effort, although too little and too late, to minimize
that damage.
On the negative side of the ledger one begins with the fact that ac-
tive military intervention is going to cost the intervening state lives
and money. Since Vietnam, governments, including that of the
United States, have been reluctant about shedding their nationals'
blood. Relatively light casualties, such as those in Somalia, numbers
51. On the effects of television in shaping reactions to genocidal events see
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND MODERN
CONSCIENCE 9-33 (1997).
52. See Martin Niemoeller, quotation, in FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (John Bartlett
ed., 15th ed. 1980).
53. See ROBERT FISK, IN TIME OF WAR: IRELAND, ULSTER AND THE PRICE OF
NEUTRALITY, 1939-45, at 178-81 (1983).
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that were "acceptable" daily losses for an infantry regiment in World
War II, are now enough to cancel operations. Other operations have
never started. It is easier to generate support for a swift surgical
strike, such as those on Grenada, Entebbe, and Panama. If humani-
tarian intervention is to tackle tougher targets, there will have to be a
change in the character of the armed forces of the major powers, a
move in the direction of expendable troops such as the Foreign Le-
gion or the Gurkhas, which did the grim work of the French and
British empires. The intervening forces are not the only ones who
may suffer casualties; numbers of the people we are trying to help
may be victims of combat operations.
If the urge to abandon neutrality is satisfied by action less intense
than military force another set of calculations is involved. Sanctions
will interrupt trade and other economic activity of importance to the
national economy having serious repercussions for particular sectors
of the economy. The United States has learned to do without trade
with Cuba but it hesitates when it comes to limiting trade with the
PRC for human rights reasons. Sanctions may also damage the
economies of innocent third countries. For example, in the Rhodesia
crisis of the 1960s the African neighbors of Rhodesia suffered major
trade losses. Finally, sanctions also impose costs on the population of
the target. Where the state aimed at is governed by a dictator it is en-
tirely likely that the dictator and his entourage are able to do very
well despite the sanctions, but that the ordinary population, particu-
larly the classes already marginal in terms of income, will suffer
great deprivation. Intervention may produce lasting hostility with the
state whose actions one is trying to thwart. It could also lead the state
that is carrying on the genocide to accelerate the carrying out of the
evil designs one is trying to stop.
One consequence of these costs for the abandonment of neutrality
is that national governments have to establish priorities. One can
send troops to, or cut off trade with, only so many countries at one
time. One goes into what is in effect a triage way of thinking. Where
can we help most with a given expenditure? Note that the decision
becomes complicated by questions as to how much other states are
willing to contribute. The humanitarian impulses of a state that stays
neutral may be assuaged by activity on behalf of refugees, detainees,
and other victims of the hostilities.
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If one matches these considerations with World War II history,
one observes that no country went to war on account of the Holo-
caust. Most countries became involved because they were attacked,
including the United States that was precipitated into war by the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor after two years of lively debate about the merits
of intervention and neutrality. 4 It also includes the Soviet Union,
which actively collaborated with the Nazis until the fateful onslaught
of June 1941. As Ireland's Eamon de Valera pointedly said,
"[n]eutrality is not a cowardly policy if you really mean to defend
yourself when attacked. Other countries have not gone crusading un-
til they were attacked."" England and France did declare war on
Germany when it attacked Poland. They did so after the Reich broke
its pledges regarding Czechoslovakia believing that they could not
trust the Reich to continue its efforts to subjugate Europe step by step
until their independence was also threatened. Some countries de-
clared war on Germany in 1945 in order to be admitted to the United
Nations. Turkey, for example, declared war "not a day earlier than
necessary to get the ticket to San Francisco." 6
How much has the situation changed since 1945? Has our full
knowledge of what genocide can mean made governments more
willing to intervene? Has the obligation under the Genocide Con-
vention "to prevent" genocide made a difference? 7 The memory of
the Holocaust remains vivid in the minds of a great many people.
CNN and other media now bring us images of atrocities as they are
happening, albeit in a selective fashion. What effect has the United
Nations system had on behavior? Candor compels one to say that the
changes are modest. The only cases of intervention entailing serious
risks of loss of life and economic damage have been those where the
population threatened is closely akin to that of the state that acts.
That was the case, for example, with Indian intervention to stop the
brutalities associated with Pakistani attempts to retain control over
54. See The German declaration of war and United States reaction, reprinted in
34 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 1 (1941).
55. JOHN P. DUGGAN, NEUTRAL IRELAND AND THE THIRD REICH 127 (1985).
56. See LOTHAR KRECKER, DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE TURKEI IM ZWEITEN
WELTKRIEG 254 (1964).
57. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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Bangladesh. 8 It was also the case with its less successful attempts to
bring peace to Sri Lanka. For the rest we have a series of "surgical
strikes," that is, interventions that are undertaken with the expecta-
tion that the troops would go in and come out in short order, leaving
behind a pacified and contented target country. Some of these inter-
ventions were under the aegis of the United Nations and others have
been unilateral. Grenada, Panama, Uganda-twice, Somalia,
Rwanda, and Cambodia come to mind. In a number of these cases,
particularly Somalia and Rwanda, the attempt was swiftly given up
when it appeared that costs were underestimated. One also observes
that some of the most extensive genocidal operations were not the
subject of any intervention effort at all. One recalls the hundreds of
thousand killed by Indonesian forces in 1965 and their other victims
in East Timor. Little note was taken of those slaughtered by the
Khmer Rouge on the killing fields of Cambodia although action was
eventually taken first by Vietnam and then by the United Nations,
largely for reasons other than humanitarian. 9 The bloody civil war in
the Sudan continues to the present day. One might add to the list the
suppression of Tibetan independence by the PRC and the suppres-
sions by various countries in the Middle East of their Kurdish mi-
norities.
Bosnia, of course, has a special place in all of this. The history of
that unhappy region highlights the hesitancy of potential intervenors.
Although Bosnia is on the edge of Europe and should especially con-
cern European states, that appeal was not enough to cause politicians
to take serious risks to improve the situation. Doing nothing was, on
the other hand, not an acceptable alternative. As a result peacekeep-
ing personnel spread out in vulnerable positions were humiliatingly
elbowed aside to become passive witnesses of massacres. It was ba-
sically the dramatic success of the Croatian offensive in the Krajina
that made it possible to impose conditions on the Serb government
and produce the somewhat unstable equilibrium that now prevails."
58. See Thomas Franck & Nigel Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Hu-
manitarian Intervention by Military Force. 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
59. See David Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1993) (providing review).
60. For an authoritative account by an active American participant see
WARREN ZIMMERMAN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS
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CONCLUSION
At the end of the century the two types of neutrality explored seem
headed for quite different destinies. Neutrality in the traditional legal
sense appears to have a limited future; with armed conflicts occur-
ring between states and other entities from time to time that do not
draw other states into their midst. As in the Iran-Iraq conflict there
will be no UNSC action and states will try to stay clear. States will
resort to the traditional rules of neutrality as they understand them. It
is possible, though not likely, that the international community will
be motivated to redraft and modernize those rules.
Neutrality in the moral sense will continue to be an important and
painful problem. One cannot tell how often ethnic strife-the princi-
pal cause of mass atrocities in recent years-will break out during
the next decade. Each outbreak will pose problems for the govern-
ments of other countries who will have to ask whether the will to in-
tervene for humanity's sake overcomes the anxiety about the cost. As
experience with such disasters grows the international community
will have greater capacities to intervene swiftly and efficiently. For
one thing, the development of international criminal law and institu-
tions to enforce it may deter potential planners and executants of
genocides;61 however, questions of cost, particularly of human life,
will remain. There is the danger that the world's populations will be-
come jaded and inclined to let these conflagrations burn out. Much
depends on how many genocidal episodes there are and how closely
together they are timed. We are certainly far from having resolved
these problems.
DESTROYERS (1996).
61. See Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
462 (providing review).
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